As early as the beginning of 1993, a Pact on Stability in Europe was drafted under the aegis of the French Premier Edouard Balladur , focusing primarily on the status of minorities and the situation of frontiers. The French proposal was undertaken by the European Council held in Copenhagen, June 21-22 1993, and so became an European Union initiative "with regard to respect for borders and rights of minorities". The European Council in Brussels (December 10-11, 1993) agreed that the Pact on Stability in Europe is pursuing an objective of preventive diplomacy therefore it is not concerned with countries in open conflict, but rather intending to contribute to stability by preventing tension and potential conflicts in Europe, to promote good neighbourly relations and to encourage countries to consolidate their borders and to resolve the problems of national minorities.

 The European Union was to endorse the fulfilment of this process, under different forms. At the same time, the Council planned a meeting of the representatives of the countries concerned under EU auspices in 1994, to seek the adoption of a document for the purpose of implementing the principles of the Pact.

 This first "diplomatic initiative" of the Twelve - following the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty - has been defined as an exercise in preventive democracy directed exclusively at those countries which are candidates for the accession to the European Union. As the authors of the Pact devised it, accession will be considered only after resolution by the applicant countries of the main sources of conflict: borders and the situation of minorities .

 The EU showed its readiness to provide a set of incentives for those countries willing to uphold the established principles of "good conduct", which have the "prospect" of becoming members of the Union later on. Concerning the consolidation of borders, the Plan wished to make a step forward as against formal statements on the inviolability of frontiers, by calling on these countries to conclude bilateral agreements which would cover the full set of problems that might affect stability in the region.

 The respect for the rights of minorities represents the second essential component of the Stability Pact. Stability of frontiers should be discussed in connection with the status of minorities as any violation of their rights is a risk prone to arouse international complications . The representatives of the Hungarian minority in Romania, and Slovakia made a request to participate in the negotiations to be carried on within the framework of the Pact alongside with the State officials , a request which although backed by the Hungarian Government remained unsuccessful. Notwithstanding the fact that minorities were denied acceptance as partners to the States, as it was requested, the Pact still ensures due consideration of the position of minorities in bilateral negotiations since any agreement on the issue of frontiers is conditional on the status enjoyed by minorities .

 The inaugural conference of the Stability Pact was held in Paris on May 26-27 this year and was attended by the European Union Member States, the candidate countries whose accession is under negotiation, countries mainly concerned by the Plan, the countries immediately bordering on the countries concerned, the States able to make a particular contribution to the initiative, countries with an interest in stability in Europe by virtue of their defence commitments and the countries having association agreements with the EU, as well as representatives of international organizations concerned by the initiative. The fundamental concept of the final document has become that of good neighbourliness, as it is defined in line with the preceding documents, in the sense that "the promotion of good neighbourly relations" explicitly includes "questions related to frontiers and minorities". It was decided "to further develop relations in the spirit of good neighbourly relations according to treaties and agreements already concluded, to continue or launch bilateral negotiations and to participate in round tables". Two regional round tables - one for the Baltic region  and  one for the other Central and Eastern European countries - will take into discussion the trans-border co-operation, the problems of minorities (emphasising on the situation of the Russian and the Hungarian minority, respectively), cultural and legislative co-operation, education in administrative and environmental issues. If there is satisfactory progress, a final conference called upon to adopt the Pact on Stability is to take place within one year.
 

 ROMANIA'S INTERESTS
 

 Back in 1992 and the beginning of 1993, we were witnessing a frontier apparently drawn between the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia (the four Visegrad countries) on the one hand, Romania and Bulgaria, on the other; a two-speed region, for which the European structures -among which the European Union, too - had been preparing two-speed strategies of assistance, and accordingly integration. The reasons for such state of things had been quite multifarious. No doubt they had in view the performance attained by the ongoing democratic process in these countries. Taking into account the limited resources that the rich countries are willing to make available for those regimes undergoing transition in Central and Eastern Europe, and the capability of institutionalized Europe to establish a new relationship between the countries in this region, that kind of a two-speed policy had only engendered winners and losers. Romania was among the losers resulting from such cleavage. The initial enthusiasm that had welcomed the Romanian Revolution was later on replaced by manifest reluctance mainly due to the developments in March 1990, Târgu Mure_, June 13-15th 1990, then September 1991.

 The Stability Pact in Europe has once again placed all countries in the region on the same starting line. Whether they do reach or not the leading echelon in the accession to the European Union, it will depend almost entirely on their willingness to resolve the problems raised by the Pact: minorities and borders.

 In this respect, Romania enjoys an exceptional context: as it seems now that despite the complexity of her recent situation she is given once again a chance to compete, on an equal footing, for the European integration.

 To this direct advantage add another indirect yet altogether not less significant one: an opportunity to resolve an issue which is crucial to the nature of Romanian society such as the situation of minorities, as well as to ensure the inviolability of frontiers under EU aegis.
 

 SOME ROMANIAN OFFICIAL STANDS
 

 In May 1994 - shortly before the meeting to be held in Paris - the Foreign Relations Department of the Chamber of Deputies circulated some "documentary papers" (no. 12) on the Stability Pact in Europe/ the Balladur Plan. The document refers, among others, (under the heading "Some Romanian stands") to the idea put forward by the Pact, according to which European standards related to the question of minorities are a minimum. The authors of this documentary papers hold this idea to be dangerous.

 Such position could hardly be sustained.
 International standards are contained in those international instruments (treaties, covenants, etc.) which have a binding force on the signatory States. However, international treaties and agreements stipulate that the protection granted thereunder is a minimum, and that the States are entitled to provide higher protection by their domestic legislation. Other documents, such as those Romania signed within the framework of the CSCE process, have introduced new milestones on the conduct of States: without having an equal force, they are nonetheless an expression of the political will of the respective State.

 The Paris draft of the Pact on Stability in Europe enumerates, alongside with the Helsinki Final Act, the Copenhagen document which contains an important section on minorities. And it says: "the reference principles of the Pact" shall be "the principles and COMMITMENTS (o.e.) established by the UN, the CSCE, and the Council of Europe", giving mention to the Copenhagen document. The reference to the CSCE COMMITMENTS, as a principle of the Pact, goes beyond the limit of international standards with a binding force. Hence it follows that if we are to contain ourselves within the limitations of such standards, as the Chamber of Deputies documentary material has put it, the Plan on Stability in Europe would be absolutely futile, since there is hardly any need for so costly a process only in order to have the States uphold the standards which they are already bound to respect as an effect of the international legally binding documents they signed.

 In his address made in Paris, at the Inaugural Conference on the Stability Pact held on May 27th 1994, the Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Teodor Mele_canu, referred to the determination shared by participating States - therefore including Romania - to establish the incipient process on the basis "of the principles and norms acknowledged by the relevant documents of the UN, CSCE and the Council of Europe", yet he avoided using the term commitments although it was clearly contained in the Conference final document, and accepted by the Romanian delegation, too. Such stand is to be taken into consideration, and the more so as the Romanian Government has already included as legal norms in a treaty having a binding force - the Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany - under Article 15 "the standards on the protection of minorities contained in the document of the Copenhagen meeting" which is obviously in the spirit of the Stability Pact in Europe and goes beyond the current international provisions with a binding force in this area. Hence one might come to a conclusion that the Romanian State is willing to grant to the German minority in this country such opportunities as it would deny to the Hungarian minority, which is a much larger and one of the major topics falling under the Pact. This would mean a policy of discriminating standards as against minorities in Romania.

 In connection with the Romanian authorities attitude to those standards promoted by the regional structures to which Romania is invited to participate, it appears significant to mention the stand taken by the Romanian President towards our integration into the Council of Europe. The President's spokesman, Mr. Traian Chebeleu, stated on the press conference on May 20th 1994 that Romania's commitments to the Council of Europe had been formulated only in the "correspondence of Romanian authorities with the rapporteurs from the Council of Europe". Concerning Romania's acceptance to the Council of Europe, "some recommendations have been made on the occasion of the acceptance", but only this far, as ambassador Traian Chebeleu explicitly stressed it. Nevertheless, as neither commitments entered into by correspondence, nor recommendations do have a binding force, the formulation in the Paris document of the Stability Pact according to which the principles in the Pact also include any commitments established by the Council of Europe would only remain ineffective for the Romanian authorities, unless they considered themselves really bound to the commitments made before the Council of Europe.
 

 CONCLUSIONS
 

 The Pact on Stability in Europe provides an exceptional opportunity for Romania's integration into the European architecture. It is now for the second time after the Revolution (whose international effects have been wrecked because of the developments in March 19-20 and June 13-15 1990 etc.) that Romania is capable of making a proof of her compatibility with the principal European institutions and make up for the timing lost in her international relations.

 Another major advantage to Romania is the influence of the important European States to be exerted through the Pact with a view to concluding a basic political treaty with Hungary, which would only confirm the existing borders. By its requirements on the status of minorities, and limitations on the calendar of negotiations (one year), the Pact on Stability in Europe seems to be a rather severe one. However, the ensurance of European standards for the minorities in Romania, through an appropriate speedy process, is to be equally looked upon as an advantage to the Romanian State.

 Official stands regarding Romania's co-operation on the Stability Pact in Europe have been until now quite ambiguous, even reticent. In certain cases they have made use of such reasons which mirror a lack of understanding of the meaning to be attached to international documents and interests of the Romanian State. Such stands are inopportune and should be left behind.

 Meanwhile it takes a closer co-operation between Parliament (in particular by the enactment of essential legislation such as the Law on Education, the Law on Minorities, that should include adequate provisions), Government (primarily the Foreign Affairs Ministry) and the civil society in Romania, in order to make a full benefit of this exceptional opportunity granted under the Stability Pact in Europe, on which the country's evolution during the decades to come mainly depends.