20 February 1995
1. NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AFTER THE 1992 ELECTIONS

Romania is the only European country where an extremist party participates in the governance. This status held by the Romanian National Unity Party (Romanian acronym PUNR), as member of the ruling coalition, engenders a situation which cannot be compared, in terms of its practical and symbolic impact, to any other internal factor of instability. In his study, "Nationalism and European Security: Romania's Euro-Atlantic Integration", Valentin Stan demonstrates that the PUNR is a hyper-nationalistic party, as defined in John Mearsheimer's terms , and that its hyper-nationalism is not compatible with the security policy of the North-Atlantic Alliance. Valentin Stan's main thesis is that as long as the Party of Social-Democracy in Romania (Romanian acronym PDSR) will associate the PUNR to the governance, Romania has no chance of being co-opted in the Euro-Atlantic structures. Taking into account that integration into these structures constitutes the absolute priority of Romanian foreign policy, the PDSR's strategy of political alliances will affect Romania on a long term.

It is noteworthy, along the line of Valentin Stan's demonstration, that the Western analysts' perception, namely that in Romania there are inter-ethnic tensions which do not allow for its integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, was formed before the PUNR's accession to the government. The passages Valentin Stan quotes in his text date back to 1990 (John Mearsheimer ), 1992 (Huberte Hanquet and Javier Ruperez ), 1993 (SIPRI Report nr. 5 , UNIDIR Report nr. 21 ; Michael E. Brown ) and early 1994 (Lothar Ruehl ; Hans-Joachim Hoppe ). Moreover, the existence of inter-ethnic tensions, no matter how problematical it might be, is not the decisive factor which determines the stability of a state. Stability also depends on the way the authorities understand to resort to the state's democratic institutions and procedures in order to solve conflictual matters. From this point of view, it should be noted that in post-revolutionary Romania an interesting process has been going on, a process that has developed from the emergence of the first extremist-nationalistic speeches and groupings (1990) to their inclusion in the governance (1994-1995). Such a procedure not only blocks the solving of inter-ethnic problems but it also contributes to the worsening of the tensions and affects the law governed state itself.

As early as 1990, the extremist type discourse was used as an instrument of publicity in the political competition in Romania, the creation and ascent of some parties being directly linked to it. We shall not reiterate here Valentin Stan's demonstration regarding the PUNR. We shall, however, deal upon the fact that, also as regards the establishment of the Great Romania Party (Romanian acronym PRM), the racist , chauvinistic , xenophobic and anti-European  propaganda was also used on a large scale. In its turn, the Socialist Labour Party (Romanian acronym PSM) was created, to a large extent, on the basis of a discourse that denies European values in general, and the values of institutionalised Europe in particular .

Some leaders of those parties initiated an aggressive campaign, as a result of which they became an active presence in the public opinion. This determined, to a large extent, the outcome of the 1992 parliamentary elections, when the PRM and the PSM succeeded in obtaining a number of votes over the threshold of 3%, which enabled them to enter Parliament.

Through the political polarizations of November 1992, the PDSR together with the PUNR, the PRM and the PSM (which the PDAR also joined at that time) achieved the majority coalition which resulted in the V_c_roiu Cabinet. Subsequently, the parties associated to the PDSR had a steadfast evolution on the way of accession to the zone of executive decision. Thus, in August 1994 the PUNR secured two portofolio's (the Ministry of Communications, through Adrian Turicu and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, through Valeriu Tab_r_; then it was also discovered that the Minister of Justice, Iosif Gavril Chiuzbaian, too, was a PUNR member). The PRM and the PSM also acquired positions in the government, at an under-ministerial level. Finally, in January 1995, the PDSR, the PUNR, the PRM and the PSM signed a protocol in support of the V_c_roiu Cabinet.

There is no essential distinction between the PUNR's nationalist discourse (analyzed at length by Valentin Stan) and that of the political forces rallied in the PRM and the PSM. Besides, the association of the latter two parties is not only "in spirit", but it also has juridical consequences, the PRM and the PSM forming together the parliamentary group "The National Coalition". There was also a coordination of the stands and actions taken by these parties with those of the PUNR in matters related to dealing with the Hungarian minority .

To the older threats made by the PRM leader , namely to expel the parliamentarians of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Romanian acronym UDMR) or the UDMR as a whole, were added the recent PRM communique's, requesting the banning of the UDMR, "this nest of potential assassins, their trial and arrest or the expulsion of the most dangerous chieftains" . The motivation lies in the fact that "it is in the interest of European peace and stability that such paramilitary bodies and political tumours, like the UDMR, should be immediately silenced, in order to spare human lives and to observe human rights and international treaties" .

On 7 February 1995, the four parliamentary parties, the PDSR, the PUNR, the PSM and the PRM, which form the ruling coalition, met for their first working meeting. On that occasion, the PRM president, senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor, delivered an extensive speech in favour of the PUNR president. At the same time, his speech took over Gheorghe Funar's assertions, to which "new arguments" were added. Thus, the PRM president stated: "However, talking about the descendants of those barbarians, I do not think that we offend the Magyar nation, quite on the contrary, we disseminate  authentic texts, historical ones, attesting that at their origins they were primitive people, which the Romanians have never been" (emphasis added) . Further, the PRM president continues: "The so-called purging of the army, requested by Mr. Funar, was mentioned. But here is what Mr. Col. Ioan T_nas_, deputy, shows me...< the staff of the Mountain Corps Battalion in Miercurea Ciuc: more than 50% are Hungarians from that area. This means that they have 1,000 armed soldiers.> We must take steps. Of course, according to the Constitution... the minorities enjoy equal rights. But, when such a conflictual potential exists, when we very well know that they have paramilitary structures organized by houses, streets, settlements, towns, municipalities, with military conscription... do you realize what such troops of several thousands armed soldiers mean?  Do we appoint Hungarians in key positions with the Mountain Corps?... And do we put the Mountain Corps into the hands of the Hungarians?"

An examination of this text, in the light of John Mearsheimer's definition of hyper-nationalism, namely "the belief that other nations or nation-states are both inferior and threatening and must therefore be dealt with harshly" , demonstrates that, from a doctrinaire viewpoint, the Great Romania Party is a hyper-nationalistic party. The whole Magyar nation is considered to be inferior to the Romanian one (since at origin they were barbarians, and the Romanians were not). At the same time, it is considered as posing a threat - it is asserted that "they have paramilitary structures" - which calls for a firm reaction from the authorities, going as far as to purge them from the Army (the Hungarians in Romania - Romanian citizens! - should be removed from the Mountain Corps).

In the case of some leaders, like Corneliu Vadim Tudor, we can notice the purport of Stephan Van Evera's observations  about the fact that political legitimacy is in inverse ratio to the attempt of the elites to produce an aggressive nationalistic mythology. For these leaders, discredited because of the role played under the regime overthrown through revolution, the nationalist-extremist propaganda is a matter of political survival.

One cannot underestimate the effects upon the mentalities and the equilibrium of the state of the extremist nationalistic propaganda, even when it seems to be a purely demagogical one. However, no matter how relevant the decoding of the discourse of the political forces might be - as Valentin Stan in his study very convincingly does in the case of the PUNR - the authors consider that particular attention should be paid to the actions that go beyond the declamatory level and which represent direct attempts to contest the rule of law and democratic institutions .

In this respect, the declarations of Iosif Gavril Chiuzbaian, Minister of Justice (and PUNR member) are also to be noted. In January 1995, he expressed the opinion that the UDMR should be outlawed. Along the same line, in January 1995, the Great Romania Party adopted a document in which actions that fall into the category of civil and political rights of the Magyar citizens or of their organizations were qualified as being "anti-Romanian", and it also demanded the immediate banning of the UDMR. Thus, accusations are brought against: "the vote of the UDMR parliamentarians against Romania's Constitution"; "the contesting of the realities regarding the rights of the Hungarian minorities in Romania in all the international bodies to which Romania is a party"; "the obsessive presence of the majority of the UDMR parliamentarians on the lists of signatures concerning the suspending of Romania's president and the dismissal of the Cabinet"; "the steady presence in Budapest of the UDMR leaders and parliamentarians"; "the refusal to take part in the activity of the Council for National Minorities"; "the establishment of the mini-parliament under the name of the Council of the UDMR representatives and of the Council of the UDMR mayors and counsellors"  etc.

What should be kept in mind about this material signed by the Directory Committee of the PRM is not so much the series of insults or libels, but the contesting of the exercise of some rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the international legislation (parliamentary vote, freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, freedom of association a.o.).
 

2. NATIONALISM AND EFFECTS UPON THE RULE OF LAW

The alliance in the governance of the PDSR with parties of the hyper-nationalist type goes beyond the political discourse. A government is the result of the delegation of the political will of a majority coalition. Consequently, regardless of the fact that the political pact between the parties that form the majority coalition is based on a document that makes such an alliance "formal" or, on the contrary, the parties prefer to elude any written agreement, the effects of the alliance upon the governmental policy can not be overlooked. The accession of some members of the PUNR, the PRM and the PSM in the decision-making structures could be noticed immediately after the 1992 elections and in time also the steadfast influence of this phenomenon on the activity of ministries or other institutions also became manifest. Our intention, further, is to see to what extent such changes of policy can erode the democratic foundations of the state, in which case, the institutions responsible for national security are of foremost relevance.

Within the ensemble of the state structures, the institutions that are related to national security play a decisive role in supporting Romania's interests on a long term and on a global level. By the very nature of their competencies they are required to function irrespective of political situations. Their conduct is defining for the capability of the state to preserve internal stability and international credibility. Therefore, they are among the first to be evaluated from the viewpoint of the requirements for Romania's integration into Europe's security structures.

The Romanian democracy is insufficiently consolidated, after only five years since the collapse of the communist regime. Unlike the Western states which, in time, built up a democratic system based on the existence of solid independent institutions able to control each other, Romania is only in the stage of consolidating these institutions. The constant pressure of the nationalist forces involved in political governance exerted upon some democratic institutions not yet sufficiently consolidated, might undermine the country's democratic future and annul the chance of Euro-Atlantic integration. That is why it is necessary to analyze the vulnerability of these institutions to the nationalistic pressure from the zone of the governance.

The dependence of the functioning of institutions upon the political forces involved in government should be analyzed in the light of the constitutional framework and of the legislative one in general. Obviously, Romania's Constitution is the most important landmark, all the more so as the Romanian democracy has an incipient character. Account should be taken of the fact that, although imperfect, the fundamental law transforms the treaties ratified by Parliament into domestic legislation (art. 11 para. 2), and in the field of human rights it grants them precedence over the domestic laws (art. 20, para. 2). This provision is of paramount importance, given that two of the basic laws regarding national security are prior to the Constitution: Law no. 39 of 13 December 1990, concerning the setting up, organization and functioning of the Supreme Council of National Defence and Law no. 51 of 29 July 1991, regarding the national security of Romania. Although both laws contain provisions which are incompatible with the rule of law and which seriously prejudice fundamental human rights and freedoms (as we shall point out further), because of the very fact that they were adopted prior to the fundamental law, there is no possibility at present to notify the Constitutional Court about their unconstitutionality, but by invoking the exception of unconstitutionality (therefore in an individual case, which has to be a court case and in connection with a specific article and not the law as a whole); on the other hand, the Legislative Council, the competence of which is to examine the compatibility of the prior legislation with the Constitution, continues to be, three years after the adoption of the latter, one of the institutions, essential for the democratic regime in Romania, that does not function.

Even in a society with a stabilized democracy, the existence of some structures and procedures as those instituted through the aforementioned laws would raise serious question marks. Control upon the state institutions is essential for the functioning of a democratic society. When some of them elude this control, the society becomes pervious to the attempts of some forces to impose a possible authoritarian system. What could happen in a society where power is held by a coalition with one or more extremist parties? To what extent can the legislative and institutional matrix withstand such a tendency of undermining the democratic state ? Or, on the contrary, will it be used just in order to impose an extremist form of government ?
 

2.1. The Supreme Council of National Defence

The Supreme Council of National Defence (Romanian acronym CSAT) is the institution with the highest competence in the field of national security. The CSAT was established through Law no. 39/13 December 1990, "with a view to organizing and coordinating in unitary command the activities that relate to the defence of the country and the state security both in time of peace and in time of war...". The same normative act provided for the structure of the CSAT, its attributions and the method to control the activity of this body. One year later, the Constitution, adopted by referendum, stipulated in Title III (Public Authorities), Chapter V (Public Administration), Section 1 (Specialized Central Public Administration), art. 118: "The Supreme Council of National Defence shall organize and coordinate in unitary command the activities concerning the country's defence and national security." Surprisingly enough, the Constitution does not set forth its attributions, the only specifications as to this body referring to: the examination of the CSAT reports in a joint session of the Chambers of Parliament (art. 62, para. 2, item f); the character of an organic law of the normative act that regulates the CSAT (art. 72, para. 3, item d); the chairmanship of the CSAT, which is held by Romania's President (art. 92, para. 1).

Under these circumstances, Law no. 39/1990 acquires a particular importance, determining the degree to which political factors may intervene in the functioning of the CSAT. In this respect, mention should be made in the first place of the use of the phrase "state security", which appears both in art. 1 and in art. 2, item D of the law: the CSAT "performs any other attributions related to national defence and state security". The phrase "state security" appears here for the first time in the Romanian legislation after December 1989. As we have seen, it is not to be found either in the Constitution (art. 118, art. 49) or in Law no. 51/1991, the object of which is "national security". Considering that "a state is a juridical and political organization, having the power to request obedience and loyalty from its citizens" , it results that what the CSAT protects is the Romanian state, namely the public authorities and power structures. Certainly, in a society with a developed democracy the confusion between national security and state security, although a serious one, is cleared up through the intervention of the other institutions. The difference with Romania resides in the fact that, as shown above, the Constitutional Court cannot pronounce itself in this case, and Parliament, through the draft bill for the modification of the Penal Code under debate in 1994, prolonged this confusion introducing an offence regarding "the state security" .

This increased political dimension which art. 1 of Law no. 39/1990 grants to the Supreme Council of National Defence, represents a factor of greater concern, since the competence of the CSAT proves to be little circumscribed and controlled. Under item D of art.2, listing the attributions of the CSAT, it is specified: "It exerts any other attributions related to national defence and state security (emphasis added)", without any mention as to the way in which these "other attributions" are conceded. Not even the phrase "by law", which is so usual in the Romanian law, does not appear, a fact which makes us believe that this Council, although a public administration body, can take the place of Parliament and has the power to grant itself any competence it deems fit in its field of activity which, as we have seen, refers to state security and its power structures. That this is true is also proven by art. 9 of Law no. 39/1990, according to which "The decisions adopted by the Supreme Council of National Defence are binding for the citizens of the country, as well as for all the institutions and units to the activity of which they refer". Given that, according to art. 58, para. (1) of the Constitution, "The Parliament is the supreme representative body of the Romanian people and the sole legislative authority of the state",  the provision regarding the binding character of the CSAT decisions conflicts with the text of the fundamental law. Not to mention the fact that, while a law is subject to control regarding its constitutionality, either before its promulgation or by way of exception, these decisions, which are passed by an administrative body, are above any control.

It is apparent that, since its creation, the CSAT was conceived in that very way, namely as being above any form of democratic control. According to art. 8 of Law no. 39/1990, the CSAT, "through one of its members, presents every year before Parliament a report on the activity it has been carrying out, and upon the request of Parliament it presents information notes every time the circumstances require that". However, the law does not spell out which are the powers of Parliament - as supreme representative body of the people - in appraising this activity. Nor does it stipulate the sanctions to be enforced in case these reports are not submitted.

Such legislative "mistakes" or "omissions" could be exploited by a government with a nationalist-extremist ideology. By way of example, we could refer to the request addressed to Romania's President by the president of the PUNR (a party that is a member of the ruling coalition) , through which the former was asked, by virtue of the attributions conferred on him by art. 93 (1) of the Constitution, to institute the state of emergency in some localities in the counties of Harghita, Covasna and Mure_ (the majority population of the first two counties is ethnic Magyar, and in the third one the Magyar population holds an important share). Therefore, the transition was made from insulting declarations to invoking and using law texts with a view to implementing the previously expressed threats. It is to be stressed that Romania's President has the constitutional possibility to take such an exceptional measure, the Parliament being called upon to agree to it within 5 days from the moment it is taken. However, in accordance with art. 2, item C/b) of Law no. 39/1990, the CSAT examines and approves "the necessary measures... as a consequence of the declaration of the state of emergency", measures which are no longer subject to any parliamentary control but, in exchange, according to art. 9 of that law, they are binding for all the citizens.

To the previous observations it should also be added that this body can be strongly politicized, by virtue of its structure. For eight out of its ten members, there is no interdiction to be a member of a political party: the prime-minister, the minister of state in charge of the industrial and commercial activity, the minister of national defence, the minister of the interior, the foreign minister , the head of the Department of political analysis of the President's Office , the director of the Romanian Intelligence Service , the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service . Thus, the Supreme Council of National Defence, a body which can be therefore strongly politicized, organizes and coordinates the activity of the SRI, namely of an institution specialized "in the field of intelligence related to the national security of Romania" (art. 1 of Law nr. 14/1992).

The power of the CSAT to conduct, as already seen, a discretionary policy in the field of national security is amplified by the deficiencies of the complementary law regarding the national security of Romania. It contains provisions that introduce inadmissible restrictions to some basic human rights and freedoms, instrumenting procedures which are incompatible with the rule of law. Thus, in the situations considered by the art. 3 of this law as threats to the national security, the possibility exists, as stipulated under art. 13, "to carry out acts with a view to gathering information, which consist of: tapping communications, searching for information, documents or acts for the acquirement of which the access to a place, an object or the opening of an object is necessary; taking and replacing an object or document, examining it, extracting the information contained therein, as well as recording, copying or obtaining excerpts through any means; installing objects, maintaining and taking them from the places were they were placed..."

Although it is specified that these activities can be carried out only on the basis of an authorization given by a prosecutor, paragraph 5 of art. 13 stipulates that "The duration of the validity of the warrant cannot exceed 6 months. In well-grounded cases, the General Attorney can extend, upon request, the duration of the warrant, without exceeding 3 months for each extension." The fact that no maximum time limit is set means that such activities can be extended, theoretically, to the whole duration of the life of the person targeted through such a control. Taking into consideration that through such actions fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution are infringed, such as the right to private life (art. 26), the inviolability of the domicile (art. 27), the secrecy of correspondence (art. 28), to restrict the exercise of these rights for unlimited periods of time is unacceptable. Concurrently, the law provides only for the procedure of complaint lodged with the prosecutor who is hierarchically superior to the one that issued the warrant. This means that the provisions of art. 21 of the Constitution, referring to "free access to justice", are eluded. Not to mention the fact that in case the extension was ordered by the general prosecutor himself there is not even the possibility of lodging a complaint in a hierarchical way. Such discrepancies of the law can be "explained", although not "justified", by the fact that this law is previous to the Constitution (though a 5-month lapse of time between the adoption of one law and the other is not an argument), and that the Legislative Council is not operational.  Nevertheless, it is quite obvious how such mistakes could be used by an extremist government, which would not even need to operate a legislation change in order to institute control over persons.

In this respect, we would mention again that the essence of an extremist regime, based on a nationalistic, malignant ideology, resides in the very fact that the respective ideology "leads to substantial violations of human rights" , as Åsbjorn Eide specified. Whenever the institutions of the rule of law are not sufficiently consolidated and the possibility of violating the human rights exists, the nationalist-extremist ideologies associated to the governance can find a favourable ground.

The mentality of subordinating the principles of the rule of law to the ideological perspective influential today in the Government and which, therefore, dominates the Supreme Council of National Defence, is present in the "Integrated conception regarding Romania's national security", a document drawn up by the CSAT and forwarded to Parliament for approval in May 1994. According to this doctrine, under the chapter "External risk factors" for national security, it is stated: "The distorted perception abroad of the internal developments, of the difficulties confronting our country today in the process of transition, as well as the non-crystallization of a converging line of conduct of all political forces, have led and can still lead to manifestations of reserve regarding Romania". This means that a risk factor for national security is also considered to be the critical evaluation of the domestic situation made by someone inside the country but which was also conveyed abroad. That this was the hypothesis which was envisaged is confirmed by the initiative to modify the Penal Code and to introduce the offence of "Defamation of the country or nation" (art. 236/1), as it was voted on in February 1994 by Romania's Senate: "The public defamation, by any means, of the country or of the Romanian nation is punished with imprisonment from one to 5 years." Naturally, in a democratic society - as Romania wishes to be considered - there are enough possibilities to fight against such a "theory" and even to eliminate it, given that freedom of expression is enshrined not only in the European Covenant on Human Rights, or in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but it is also protected by the practice developed by the European Court for Human Rights and the Committee for Human Rights. However, none of these arguments would be accepted by a nationalist-extremist government for which the rule of law is a notion devoid of content.

It is significant that, under the chapter regarding external risk factors, it is stated: "The main global risk factors are circumscribed to the explosion of nationalism and national rivalries, the exacerbation of ethnic tensions and religious intolerance, as well as to the frailty of the general situation of the countries in transition." At the same time, the chapter concerning internal risk factors for national security fails to mention nationalism, extremist nationalism, hyper-nationalism, i.e. the very phenomena confronting Romania today.
 

2.2. The Romanian Intelligence Service

The nationalistic tendencies in the country's political governance are significantly influencing the Romanian Intelligence Service (Romanian acronym SRI), as attested by the Report regarding the fulfilment of the attributions of the SRI in the achievement of national security (October 1993 - September 1994).

The Law regarding the organization and functioning of the SRI stipulates that its activity is "organized and coordinated by the Supreme Council of National Defence." Consequently, all that has previously been said about the possibility of political control upon the CSAT is also valid for the Romanian Intelligence Service.

The report starts with the chapter "defence of the rule of law", in which a first danger to national security is identified in the issues related to national minorities, specially concerning the Hungarian minority and the Romany community. It is true that the Report uses euphemistic formulations as for instance "actions such as those mentioned above... had an isolated character and they did not find the expected effect with the members of the targeted ethnic minority..." (p. 4) or "It is worth mentioning ... that the persons of Magyar nationality in our country displayed a constructive position and a correct attitude in relation to the majority population..." (p. 5). This does nothing but stress the message that the members of the two minorities become a danger for the Romanian state the moment they militate for rights other than those accepted by the authorities or when they give another interpretation than the public authorities to events that involve people belonging both to minorities and to the majority.

The Report points out to the actions aimed at "exacerbating nationalism" and having "extremist and separatist tendencies". "Without minimizing them, we ought to say that the appeals to confrontation with the majority population (emphasis added) register a very modest response" (p. 5). The SRI reports that it has identified actions of an extremist-nationalistic character that jeopardize the law order and that these actions belong to the minorities or some "nationalist-extremist organizations abroad". As an example of initiative of an extremist nature the Report mentions "the campaign of signature gathering aiming at supporting a draft law regarding education for national minorities." (p. 5). Thus, for the Romanian Intelligence Service, the exercise of a constitutional right, a legislation initiative through the will of the citizens (Art. 73., para. 1) is a danger for the national security, becoming a target for its actions in defence of the rule of law.

Along the same line, of considering issues pertaining to national minorities as dangers for national security, the SRI Report also deals with the Romany ethnic group. The Report considers the exercise of the right of freedom of expression as an intention to "exploit with propagandistic aims some incidents which occurred in the relationships between some of the members of the group and other citizens, on the background of severe anti-social deeds and serious infringements of the law" (p. 7). Further on, the Report continues: "It has to be emphasized that in the respective conflicts the protagonists were always the citizens and not the ethnic groups, and their unfolding had a strictly situational, local and inter-personal significance" (p. 7).

The investigations carried out in the localities where conflicts between Romanies and the other inhabitants took place, show that these conflicts indeed emerged on the background of severe anti-social deeds and serious infringements of the law. Considering both the evolution of the events and the general context, the conclusions drawn by some organizations in Romania (such as the Romanian Helsinki Committee) and by international organizations (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Amnesty International a. s. o.) were that the respective incidents did have an inter-ethnic dimension and that they were in no way confined to a local, situational and inter-personal significance. Besides, this conclusion was inherent given the non-enforcement (or deficient enforcement) of the law in more than 30 cases of violence perpetrated against the Romanies. In this respect, it is necessary to underline the fact that the Romanian Intelligence Service has no competence to qualify as threats to national security those opinions which are contrary to the ones expressed by the government, whether they refer to national minorities or to any other issue of public interest.

In the SRI Report it is stated that: "...some Romany elements , by distorting the realities in our country through denigrations and accusations, incited to actions of a nature to affect Romania's image abroad..." (p. 7). The example cited to this effect is the one of Csurkuly Sandor (presented as the leader of the Târgu Mure_ branch of the Free Democratic Union of the Romanies in Romania, although he is the leader of the Romanies Union) who "supplied biased information to certain bodies, about the conflict at H_d_reni, presenting it distortedly, not as an anti-social, common law criminal offence, but as an inter-ethnic confrontation" (p. 8). The Romanian Intelligence Service ordains which judgement corresponds or not to the realities in Romania and charges that certain opinions affect Romania's image abroad. Thus, it infringes Art. 4, para. 1 of the Law regarding Romania's national security which stipulates that "the provisions under art.3 (enumerating the threats to the national security of Romania - a. a.) cannot be interpreted or used with a view to restrict or forbid the right to defend a legitimate cause, to express a protest or disagreement of an ideologic, political, religious or any other nature...". The actions given as example in the SRI Report clearly fall into the category of disagreements or protests and the accusations brought by the Report infringe upon the constitutional guarantees and the law regarding national security.

Assertions such as those in the Report are an action of intimidation directed against those who make critical remarks about deeds of a social, cultural, ethnic or political nature in Romania, being thus a flagrant violation of the freedom of conscience and of expression.

The stands taken in the SRI Report offer arguments to those members of the national minorities who speak about the feeling of insecurity experienced by the minorities and of the need for some collective measures to manage their lives, going as far as internal self-determination, local and personal autonomy. For instance, the request of the UDMR that the minorities become a constitutive factor of the state - a standpoint which is difficult to uphold if we have in view the political-juridical criteria that govern the life of a modern state  - finds an emotional justification in the way the SRI Report deals with the Hungarian and Romany minorities.

If the SRI, a state body which is in duty bound to watch upon national security in an equal way - i. e. relative to all the citizens of the country - refers to minorities as a potential danger for national security, it is then not absurd (in relation to subjective factors) that these minorities consider themselves endangered and estranged from the existing state  and that they wish to be defined as a distinct component of the state.

In the chapter on the defence of the rule of law reference is also made to the identification of totalitarian or extremist actions. This activity of the SRI is based on Art. 3, para. h, of the Law regarding the national security of Romania, which defines as threat to national security "the initiation, organization and carrying out or supporting in any way of totalitarian or extremist actions of a communist, fascist, legionnaire or of any other origin, racist, anti-Semitic, [actions]...". The Report refers to the extremist right, denouncing groupings of a legionnaire nature, parties (the Party of the National Right), foundations (Annunciation, the Association of former presidents and chiefs of students associations in the period 1919-1948), publications (Gazeta de Vest - Timi_oara, Puncte Cardinale - Sibiu), publishing houses (Gordian, Marineasa). Likewise, for the extremist left the given examples are: the League of Romanian Communists, the Initiative Committee for the setting up of the Romanian Communist Party and the Sparkle of Socialism.

At this point of the SRI Report, the selective political character of the operation of identifying the groupings that fall under Art. 3, para. h, of the Law regarding national security, is strikingly clear. Indeed, the SRI Report fails to mention the well-known groupings in the Romanian society, which, on a much larger scale, "initiate, organize or carry out" actions such as those the Party of the National Right, the Annunciation, publications like Puncte Cardinale etc. are reproached with. Thus, no mention is made of the hyper-nationalistic groupings, the PUNR, the PRM, the PSM, which belong to the ruling coalition. The systematic omission of the responsibility of these parties (which affects the rule of law and the fundamental rights and freedoms) by enumerating others, represents a manifest political involvement of an institution that is under the obligation to be equidistant, and it results in noxious effects upon the democratic balance in Romania. As already shown, this fact is explained by the correlation of the present constitutional and legislative - faulty - framework with the tendencies of the political alliance that controls today Romania's Parliament and Government.

3. CONCLUSIONS
 

Contrary to what the Romanian authorities usually claim, namely that Romania is "an island of stability", the analyses of Western experts show that the tensions of an ethnic nature in our country have reached a level which is incompatible with the integration in the Euro-Atlantic security structures. At the same time, the hyper-nationalistic discourse in the zone of political governance demonstrates that Romania is really confronted with an ethnocratic problem. Important institutions of the Romanian state, such as the Supreme Council of National Defence, or the Romanian Intelligence Service, through the nationalistic tendencies apparent in their activity, have proved to be under pressure from some political factors of a nationalist-extremist orientation.

Lately, analysts have focused on the participation of the PUNR in the governance, Romania being the sole country in Europe where such a political association exists.  However, the threat to the internal and external balance of the country, as a consequence of the ascent of nationalist extremism, does not originate, in the first instance, in the August 1994 decision of co-opting the PUNR in the governance. The political foundation of the extremist danger resides in the setting up of a majority parliamentary coalition comprising, besides the PUNR, also other parties the political action of which is based on an aggressive nationalist discourse: the PRM and the PSM. The last two parties did not enter the government, but they received positions up to under-ministerial level in the decision-making structures. Concurrently, they determine the decisions of the Legislature and the Executive through the political act of the alliance (sanctioned in January 1995 through a protocol). It becomes apparent that the accession to the government of one of the coalition member parties is only a matter of ultimate consequence, the most radical one, resulting from the PDSR's will of political collaboration with extremist parties.

Consequently, Romania cannot promote the principles of the rule of law and fulfil the prerequisites for Euro-Atlantic integration merely through the PDSR's giving up the association with the PUNR in the governance. In this respect, it is compulsory that the PDSR suspend its political alliances with all the hyper-nationalistic parties and at the same time, that the nationalist current inside the PDSR be also eliminated. It goes without saying that such developments suppose "a contract" on the national priorities among the main responsible political forces. In Romania, there are many radical differences between the opposition parties and the PDSR. However, none of these differences compare to the responsibility of all to offer Romania the chance of its participation in the European construction and, implicitly, the chance of its domestic reconstruction in the spirit of the democratic values of the continent.